Markdown Version | Session Recording

Session Date/Time: 03 Nov 2025 19:30

HRPC

Summary

This HRPC session featured two in-depth technical presentations on internet censorship and surveillance. The first presentation, "Locknet," detailed China's multi-layered system of online control, from physical infrastructure to service-level moderation and real-world consequences. The second, "Great Firewall Export," presented a case study of Pakistan, revealing how Chinese and Western technologies are used to implement mass surveillance and internet censorship. The session also included updates on active HRPC drafts, a call for new authors, and announcements for related work within the IETF community, alongside a reminder from the IRTF chair regarding the status of expired drafts.

Key Discussion Points

Locknet: How China Controls its Internet and Why it Matters

• Presenters: Laura Edelson (Northeastern University) and Jessica Badkechie (Cybersecurity for Democracy).
• Core Concept: The "Locknet" is a metaphor for China's multi-stage, multi-layered information control system, likened to a water management system. It's designed to censor content, shape user knowledge and beliefs, and maintain the power of the Communist Party of China.
• Definition of Censorship: A restriction on the flow of information by or at the behest of a government, with a threat of real consequences if not complied with. This distinguishes it from general content moderation.
• Integrated Control Layers:
  • Physical Infrastructure: China has only five state-owned ISPs and very few international gateways, providing indirect but significant governmental control over the most basic internet infrastructure.
  • Network Level: Most censorship occurs at the border using "middle boxes." Techniques include IP range blocking, DNS injection/spoofing, TCP resets, SNI filtering, and increasingly, QUIC traffic disruption. New protocols are initially ignored, then filtered or blocked once adoption reaches a threshold.
  • Service Level: Third-party service providers (search engines, social media, LLM chats) must register with the government and impose content restrictions. Companies create their own lists of prohibited topics, leading to self-censorship. Moderation involves automatic keyword recognition, human review, and AI systems.
  • "Meat Space" (Offline Compulsion): Legal regimes enforce consequences (fines, business suspension, police interrogation, jail time) for posting or hosting deemed illegal content. Punishments are publicized to serve as a deterrent.
• Meta-Censorship:
  • Platform Substitution: Banning popular global apps drives users to China-based censored platforms.
  • Circumvention Combat: Significant resources are spent to combat unapproved circumvention technology (e.g., probing for proxy servers, blocking app stores). Semi-official VPNs exist but are surveilled.
  • Real-world Punishments: Even users accessing the global internet via circumvention tools can face legal repercussions.
• Content and Vagueness: China censors a wide range of content, with rules that are intentionally vague (e.g., "endangering national security," "harming the nation's honor," "dissemination of rumors"). This provides wide latitude for retroactive application of censorship.
• Covert Nature: Unlike censorship in liberal democracies, Chinese censorship is largely covert, making it difficult to externally observe, and sometimes even for the user whose content is affected.
• Socio-Technological System: China's internet is a parallel internet, fully integrated with censorship throughout its stack and into the physical world, creating fundamental technological and social differences.
• Q&A Highlights:
  • Retroactive Censorship: Content previously shared without issue can later be deemed illegal, and past sharing can be punished.
  • Global Chinese Platforms: Platforms like WeChat/Weixin and TikTok/Douyin have domestic and international versions, with different censorship levels based on user registration origin (Chinese vs. international phone numbers). Red Note (Xiaohongshu) was a single version, subjecting all users to Chinese content restrictions.
  • AI Bias: Models trained on censored corpuses will inherently perform differently. Dynamic censorship requires inference-time control. Some LLMs (e.g., DeepSeek) aim for competitiveness by removing external filters, but deep embedding of censorship is a concern. China maintains an AI registry requiring algorithms to be registered.
  • Physical Infrastructure Intent: The limited number of ISPs and international gateways is an intentional design choice to facilitate control, rather than a vulnerability. Fewer choke points make it easier to disconnect from the global internet or impose friction.

Great Firewall Export: Pakistan Case Study

• Presenter: Yerifon Bergen (Amnesty International).
• Report: "Shadows of Control" (September report) detailing Pakistan's mass surveillance and internet censorship.
• Key Finding: Pakistani authorities have access to a mass surveillance and internet censorship machine, fueled by Chinese, European, Emirati, Canadian, and American companies, impacting human rights. This is a case study of Great Firewall export.
• LIMS (Lawful Interception Monitoring System):
  • Capabilities: Eavesdropping on phone calls, messages, location, and unencrypted web visits.
  • Mandate: Pakistani Telecommunications Authority requires ISPs to allow wiretapping of 2% of their subscriber base (over 4 million people). Telecom providers cannot refuse requests from the Pakistani military.
  • Legal Basis: A warrant explicitly grants intelligence officers (rank 18+) unlimited access to wiretap without needing judicial warrants.
  • Supply Chain: Data Fusion (Emirati, formerly Trovicor/Nokia Siemens Networks) and Utim (German, Deep Packet Inspection software) for monitoring. Niagara Networks (US) for fiber optic bypass equipment.
• WMS (Web Monitoring/Management System):
  • WMS 1.0: Deployed by Sandvine (Canadian), known for its role in censorship. Sandvine is now on the US entity list. Involved SS8 and A. Hampton.
  • WMS 2.0 (Chinese Firewall Export): Developed by Jeets Network (Chinese). Information from leaked GitLab, Confluence, and Jira databases (T-Networks shared with Chinese Academy of Sciences), OSINT, and trade data.
  • Capabilities: Website censorship, VPN blocking (emulating apps, pulling domains/IPs), unencrypted email interception, unencrypted HTTP spyware injection, comparison of online activity with billing/biometric data for real-world identity mapping.
  • Deployment: Primarily at cable landing stations, International Gateway in Karachi, VoIP command centers (due to concerns about VoIP traffic), and PTCL/Transworld Associates stations. Around 60,000 URLs actively blocked.
  • Supply Chain for WMS 2.0: E-link China (subsidiary of China Electronics Corporation, state-owned), Huawei components (unclear role), Niagara Networks, and Thales (software licensing components).
  • Jeets Network Context: A commercial variant of the Chinese Great Firewall, marketed as part of the Belt and Road initiative, with Fanning Bingsing (the "father of the Chinese Great Firewall") involved. Another CEC subsidiary (SIAC) previously exported similar tech to Venezuela.
• Q&A Highlights:
  • Data Sources: Leaked documents from T-Networks (GitLab, Confluence, Jira databases) for WMS 2.0; commercial trade data (Sayari, 52W&B, Panjiva) for LIMS.
  • Data Analysis: Operators can identify popular protocols/circumvention tech, then map users to real-world identities via telco billing and biometric databases. Blocking decisions often appear arbitrary.
  • Market Regulation vs. Human Rights: While Jeets Network is a private company, it's marketed by a Chinese state-owned enterprise. Many Western companies are involved in the supply chain. This raises questions about due diligence, supply chain transparency, and export controls.
  • Threat Models: Academic research on optimizing censorship techniques (e.g., for circumvention tech) is often public. While some techniques (HTTP spyware injection, HTTPS decryption with root CAs) are not novel, the arms race continues. Psyphon is noted as a circumvention technology that Jeets Network struggles to block effectively.

HRPC Draft Updates

• HRPC Association Draft: Currently stuck in shepherd review. The current authors are experiencing frustration due to the need for large-scale revisions.
• IP-based Censorship Resistance (IPB) Draft: A new version has been uploaded to GitHub. It is awaiting Datatracker unlock for official submission. The goal is to move towards a last call soon.
• New Work Idea: The group is discussing starting work related to the IPB draft, focusing on specific considerations for how technology can be used to enhance child abuse prevention. A study draft and a presentation for the next IETF are planned.

AOB / Related Work & Announcements

• Per-G Session (Friday): Will feature a talk on armor/censorship and a discussion on "chat control."
• ECH Protocol (Encrypted Client Hello): Mentioned as a protocol that hides the destination address, making traffic management for blocking more difficult, potentially leading to all-or-nothing blocking scenarios. A patch proposal to protect the source was also mentioned.
• Privacy Preference Declarations (IOT-OPS, Wednesday): Work on defining personal privacy policies that can be automatically reconciled against company offerings.
• W3C/UN Collaboration: Ongoing efforts to build threat models that incorporate societal and human rights impacts, using methods like "Lego Series Play" to help engineers identify harms and threats.
• Parental Controls (Side Event, Tuesday): Discussion on achieving interoperability for fragmented parental control systems.
• Formal Methods Research Group (Tuesday): Presentation on end-to-end encrypted messaging specifically designed for whistleblowers and high-risk groups.
• HRPC Mailing List: A call for attendees to subscribe to the mailing list and share relevant information about events and ongoing work.
• IRTF Chair Nudge: Dirk Kutscher noted that all four HRPC drafts are expired and encouraged the group to focus on progressing them or making decisions about their status.
• UN General Assembly: An OHCHR report (a follow-up to their 2023 report connecting human rights and standards) focusing on what Standards Development Organizations (SDOs) can do, is currently being debated.
• ARMOR Side Meeting: A new proposed IRTF group focused on censorship and its network implications will have a side meeting. This group aims to provide a dedicated space for broader conversations on censorship from research and protocol implementation perspectives.

Decisions and Action Items

• HRPC Association Draft:
  • Decision: Seek new authors/editors to take up the revisions required for the draft.
  • Action Item: Nick Doty (shepherd) to connect with interested individuals and provide an update on past work.
• IP-based Censorship Resistance (IPB) Draft:
  • Action Item: Once the Datatracker is unlocked, the new version of the draft will be uploaded.
  • Action Item: A 2-week feedback period will be initiated for the new IPB draft.
• New Work on Child Abuse Prevention:
  • Action Item: Continue studying and drafting the new work item.
  • Action Item: Plan a presentation on this topic for the next IETF.
• Expired HRPC Drafts:
  • Action Item: The group is encouraged to focus on the existing four expired drafts, either by progressing them, seeking new authors, or making decisions about their future status.
• Mailing List Engagement:
  • Action Item: Attendees and HRPC members are encouraged to subscribe to the HRPC mailing list and use it to share relevant updates and calls for participation.

Next Steps

• HRPC Association Draft: New authors or editors to come forward and engage with Nick Doty.
• IPB Draft: The chairs will ensure the draft is uploaded and feedback is solicited.
• New Work: The HRPC leadership will continue to develop the proposal for work on child abuse prevention.
• General Drafts: The group will review the status of its expired drafts and prioritize engagement to either advance, revise, or conclude them.
• Collaboration: Continued engagement with related efforts, including Per-G, IOT-OPS, W3C, and the proposed ARMOR group, is encouraged.